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and other pertinent clauses of the constitu-
ti~n does not alter this situation. Thus no 
invalidity is shown with respect to plaintiffs' 
hypothecized express trust, from which a 
resulting trust would follow. The.position 
of plaintiffs is that of employes seeking to 
enforce contractual rights, and not of bene-
ficiaries of either an express or resulting 
trust. 
In- summary, the salary deductions which 
plaintiffs here seek to recover were, as 
plaintiffs 'concede, made under a mistake 
of law·as to the effect of the 1935 charter 
amendments upon their contractual rights 
as city employes. The same mistake of law 
resulted in the payment to plaintiffs of pen-
sions computed upon a fixed rather than a 
fluctuating basis. Plaintiffs' causes of ac-
tion asking payment of increased past due 
pension instalments as weB as for reim-
bursement of salary deductions seek to re-
cover money due for breach ,of an employ-
ment contract and are actions at law. (Ab-
bott v. City of Los Angeles (1958), supra, 
50 Ca1.2d .438,462 [22bl, 326 P.2d 484.) It 
_ foHows that the six-months' claims provi-
sions of the city charter apply to the salary 
deductions, as they do with respect to past 
due pension payments, and here bar recov-
ery of any such deduction made more than 
six months prior to the filing of claims 
therefor by the respective plaintiffs. Plain-
tiffs concede that all salary deductions were 
made prior to the commencement of such 
six months' period. 
The judgments are reversed with direc-
tions to the trial court to enter judgments 
in favor of plaintiffs in accordance with-the 
-conc1usions dec1ared in the foregoing opin-
ion, if the court finds that it can do so: upon 
the present record, and, if not, then the 
., 
court is directed to take such further evi-
dence as may be necessary to compu~~ :the 
amounts due to each plaintiff, to make such 
computations, and thereupon to enter ';judg-
ments accordingly. 
GIBSON, C. J., and TRAYNOR, Mc-
COMB, PETERS, WHITE and DOOL-
ING, JJ., concur. 
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Proceeding by consultant under trust 
instrument for removal and substitution of 
a trustee. The Superior Court, Los An-
geles Coupty, George Francis, J., assigned 
by chairman of Judicial Council, denied the 
motion and consultant appealed. In a sepa-
rate proceeding, the testamentary trustee 
sought instructions concerning its power. 
The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, 
Beach Vasey, J., made an order instructing 
the trustee and consultant appealed. The 
. Supreme Court, Traynor, J., held that 
trustee's failure to comply with provisions 
of ,trust instrument limiting amount of 
funds that could be deposited in a single 
bank and requiring a segregated semi-an-
nual accounting, and the constant hostility 
between consultant named in the instrument 
and the trustee with respect to administra-
. tion of the trust required removal and sub-
stitution of the trustee. ' : ;. 
Orders denying re~~val and isub~titu_ 
tion of trustee and instructing trustee re-
versed. 
Opinions, 12 Cal.Rptr. 583, 13 Cal.Rptr. 
56u, and 17 Cal.Rptr. 158, 366 P.2d 510, 
vacated, 
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I. Trusls <8=>167 
Other beneficiaries were not indis-
pensable parties to proceeding for removal 
of trustee where consultant's notice of mo-
tion to remove trustee and supporting affi-
davit fully set forth facts relied upon for 
relief and the trustee appeared and defend-
ed on the merits. 
2. Trusts <8=>167 
Notice of motion to remove trustee and 
supporting affidavit, coupled with trustee's 
appearance, were sufficient to invoke trial 
court's general equity jurisdiction. 
3. Appeal and Error <8=>77(1) 
Order denying motion to remove a 
trustee was appealable as a final judgment in 
the action. West's Ann.Prob.Code, § 1240; 
West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 963, subd. 1. 
4. Trusts <8=>166(1) 
Hostility between beneficiary and trus-
tee is ground for removal of trustee when 
hostility impairs proper administration of 
trust. 
5. Trusts <8=>167 
Removal and substitution of trustee is 
largely within discretion of trial court. 
6. Trusts <8=>166(1) 
Trustee's failure to comply with pro-
visions of trust instrument limiting amount 
of funds that could be deposited in a single 
bank and requiring a segregated semiannual 
accounting, and constant hostility between 
consultant named in instrument and trustee 
with respect to administration of trust re-
quired removal and substitution of trustee. 
National Housing Act, § 401 et seq., 12 U.S. 
C.A. § 1724 et seq.; Federal Deposit In-
surance Act, § 1 et seq., 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811 
et seq.; West's Ann.Code Civ.Proe. § 1700.-
6. 
Eric A. Rose and Pray, Price & Wil-
liams, Long Beach, for appellant. 
Johnson & Johnson and George R. John· 
son, Long Beach, for respondent. 
TRAYNOR, Justice. 
In his will Joseph Gilmaker created a 
testamentary trust. Under the terms of the 
trust instrument, which -was incorporated in 
the final decree of distribution, the Bank of 
America is to serve as trustee and peti-
tioner Joseph Louis Gilmaker is to be the 
sole life beneficiary, On his death the re-
mainder is to go to petitioner's wife and 
children. Petitioner is also appointed by 
the trust instrument as "Consultant, and the 
Trustee shall not sell, lease, exchange, hy-
pothecate, or improve any property which is 
a part of the trust estate, or invest or rein-
vest any trust estate funds until it has first 
notified said Consultant in writing of its in-
tention to so act and received from said 
Consultant his written approval of the 
action so proposed." 
A large part of the trust property is un-
divided one-half interests in parcels of real 
property, the other one-half of which is 
owned by petitioner. The trust instrument 
provides that "The trustee shall not main-
tain in anyone bank or branch thereof a 
cash balance of more than the maximum 
balance insured by the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation, but shall distribute 
trust funds among as many banks as neces-
sary to secure full protection against loss 
through bank failure." The trustee, how-
ever, "shall accept and comply With any 
instructions of defendant's said son, JO-
SEPH LOUIS GILMAKER, relating to 
the selection of banks in which such de-
posits are to be made." The trustee is also 
to provide the consultant "semi-annually 
with an itemized statement setting out in-
come and expense for each parcel of im-
proved real estate in the trust estate, and 
[he] shall be consulted regarding the 
amount of fire and other insurance carried 
on each parcel." 
Petitioner moved for the removal and 
substitution of the trustee. He alleged in 
his motion, and stated in his affidavit, that 
the trustee had maintained $49,000 in one 
bank account; that the trustee has refused 
to provide him with the semi-annual ac-
counting called for by the trust instrument; 
and that the trustee has refused to con-
sult with him as provided in the trust in-
strument. The motion for removal was de-
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nied. In a separate proceeding the trustee 
sought instructions concerning its power. 
The trial cuurt found 'that the Htrustee has 
the sole, power to propose the investment 
and re-investment of trust fu~ds" subject 
to the approval of the consultant. Petition-
er appeals from the order denying removal 
and the order instructing the trustee. 
[1-3] In Estate of Schloss, 56 Cal.2d 
248,253-256, 14 Cal.Rptr. 643, 363 P.2d 875, 
we held that the superior court sitting in 
probate has no jurisdiction to remove a 
trustee of a testamentary trust after distri-
bution (see Prob.Code, §§ 112(}"1130) and 
that the court's power to remove such a 
trustee must be exercised pursuant to its 
general equity jurisdiction. (See Civ.Code, 
§ 2283.) In support of this conclusion we 
pointed out that the Legislature made no 
provision for an appeal from an order in 
probate removing a trustee. (See Prob. 
Code, § 1240.) The trustee contends, there-
fore, that the trial court did not err in 
denying petitioner's motion in the probate 
proceedings to remove it as trustee and that 
the appeal from that order must be dis-
missed. In the Schloss case, however, the 
trustees raised the question of jurisdiction 
by demurring to the petition for their re-
moval in the trial court, and that question 
was the principal issue on appeal. In the 
present case, the trustee did not object 
in the trial court to its assumption of juris-
diction and did not raise the question on ap-
peal until after the appeal was decided by 
the District Court of Appeal and a hearing 
was granted in this court. Petitioner's no-
tice of motion to remove the trustee and its 
supporting affidavit fully set forth the facts 
relied upon for relief, the trustee appeared 
and defended on the merits, and the other 
beneficiaries were not indispensable parties. 
(Bowles v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 574, 
584, 283 P.2d 704.) Under these circum-
stances the notice of motion and supporting 
affidavit coupled with the trustee's appear-
ance were sufficient to invoke the trial 
court's general equity jurisdiction (In re 
.Thompson's Estate, 101 Cal. 349, 353-354, 
35 P. 991, 36 P. 98, 508; In re De Leon, 
102 Cal. 537, 541, 36 P. 864; In re Oary, 
112 Cal. 292, 294-295, 44 P. 569; Faxon 
v. All Persons, 166 Cal. 707, 712, 137 P. 
919, L.R.A.l916B, 1209; see also, Schlyen 
v. Schlyen, 43 Cal.2d 361, 378, 273 P.2d 897; 
Coons v. Henry, 186 Cal.App.2d 512, 519, 9 
Cal.Rptr. 258; Estate of Mullins, 190 Cal. 
App.2d 413, 417-418, 12 Cal.Rptr. 3; Phil-
lips v. Beilsten, 164 Cal.App.2d 450, 457-
458, 330 P.2d 912; d. Estate of Davis, 136 
Cal. 590, 597, 69 P. 412; King v. Chase, 
159 Cal. 420, 424-425, 115 P. 207), and its 
order denying petitioner's motion is appeal-
able as a final judgment in the action. 
(Code Civ.Proc. § 963, subd. 1.) 
Petitioner contends that the trustee vio-
lated its duty by maintaining $49,000 in one 
bank account and by refusing to provide a 
particularized semi-annual accounting. He 
further contends that hostility and dis-
agreement between him apd the trustee 
prevents the consultation the testator con-
sidered essential to the proper administra-
tion of the trust. The trustee contends 
that it is willing to fonow petitioner's sug-
gestions concerning the deposit of the $49,-
000, but that the petitioner has thus far 
suggested only savings and loan associa-
tions and not banks insured by the F eder-
al Deposit Insurance Corporation; and 
that it is willing to make the kind of semi-
annual accounting called for by the trust 
instrument but that such an accounting 
would be an extraordinary service for 
which it would charge an extraordinary fee. 
The trustee further contends that all its 
suggestions for investment have been pru-
dent; that the consultant's only function 
is to veto and not to advise; and that what-
ever _ hostility exists between the trustee 
and -the consultant has not impaired the 
proper administration of the trust. 
By maintaining $49.000 in cash in one 
trust account the trustee failed to foIlow 
the trust directions. Under the trust in-
strument the trustee could keep no more 
funds in one bank than was insured by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
insures a maximum of $10,000 of any trust 
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estate deposited in a bank. (12 V.S.C.A. § 
1817(i).) It is true that the instructions 
given by the consultant to deposit the mon~ 
ey in designated. savings and loan asso-
ciations were insufficient. Savings and 
loan association accounts can be insured 
by the Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation, not by the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation. (See 12 U. 
S.CA. § 1724 et seq.; 12 U.S. CA. § 1811 
et seq.) Even in the absence of sufficient 
directions from the consultant, however, 
the trustee was under the duty to place the 
funds in various institutions where they 
would be fully insured by the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation. Furthermore, 
the trustee was under a duty to provide the 
consultant with a semi-annual accounting 
of receipts and disbursements for each par~ 
cel of real estate in the trust. It may be. 
as the trustee contends, that usually such 
an accounting is extraordinary and that its 
practice is to report the receipts and dis~ 
bursements for the entire trust without 
segregating the parcels. In the trust in~ 
strument, however, the trustee expressly 
agreed to provide a segregated account-
ing. The annual compensation of the trus~ 
tee is to be three-quarters of one per cent 
of the reasonable value of the trust es-
tate, and "For any unusual or special serv-
ices, a reasonable additional compensation." 
The trustee cannot now contend that a 
service it expressly agreed to provide is 
unusual or special. 
[4] Hostility between the beneficiary 
and the trustee is a ground for removal of 
the trustee when the hostility impairs the 
proper administration of the trust (Brown 
v. Memorial Nat. Home Foundation, 162 
Cal.App.2d 513, 534, 329 P.2d Jl8, 75 A.L. 
R.2d 427; OverelJ v. OvereIJ, 78 Cal.App. 
251, 258-260, 248 P. 310; Vest v. Bialson, 
365 Mo. Jl03, Jl21-1122, 293 S.w.2d 369, 
63 A.L.R.2d 504; Rest. of Trusts, § 107, 
comment c; 1 Scott on Trusts (2d ed.), 
p. 778; Bogert on Trusts (2d ed.), § 527, 
pp. 376-378.) 
The hostility between the trustee and pe-
titioner has been constant and intense. 
There has been disagreement over t11e in-
vestment of the surplus cash; over who 
should collect the rents from the real prop-
erty j and over the kind of insurance to 
carryon the property. At one time, ac-
cording to uncontradicted testimony. one of 
the trustee's senior trust officers told pe-
tition.er: "Now, listen here. You've been 
coming down here at least once a week 
bothering us and you do not have to come 
back any more. I'll put a stop to this and 
we'll petition the Court for instructions 
relating to the investments." 
The proper administration of the trust 
requires that there be no hostility between 
the trustee and the beneficiary-consultant. 
U 'Consultant' means a person not a trus-
tee designated in a trust to advise or di-
rect the trustee in respect of any matters 
or things connected with the trust, or whose 
consent or approval is required to purchas-
es, sales, exchanges, or other transactions 
on the part of the trustee." (Code Civ. 
Proc. § 1700.6.) Petitioner is not only ap-
pointed a consultant under the trust, he is 
also the sole life beneficiary; he owns an 
undivided one-half interest in property the 
other half of which is in the trust, and 
he had experience managing the entire 
property before the death of his father. 
In these circumstances the task of the con-
sultant is to advise, not simply passively 
to concur or veto. The trustee does not 
have, as the instructions of the trial court 
stated, the "sale power to propose the in-
vestment and re-investment of trust funds." 
A close working relationship is called for 
between the trustee and the consultant. 
Furthermore, the organization of the staff 
of the trustee is -not conducive to re-es-
tablishing a relationship free from the 
existing hostility. Trust decisions are made 
by the trustee's trust committee. The trust 
committee does not meet with outsiders. 
Thus messages beween the trustee and the 
consultant must pass through a trust offi~ 
cer, who himself has no power to make 
decisions. This conduit mechanism has 
magnified existing difficulties and is not 
likely to improve them. 
BEST v. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 
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[5,6] The removal and substitution of 
a trustee is largely withi~' the discretion 
of the trial .court. (JQnes v. Stubbs, 136 
Cal.App.2d 490, 501-502, . .288 P.2d 939; 
Estate of Keyston, 102 Cal.i\pp.2d 223, 228, 
227 P.2d 17.) It is undisputed, however, 
that the trustee failed', to disperse the 
surplus cash of $49,000 and failed to pro-
vide a segregated semi-annual 'account~ 
ing. The trustee's only defense, which is 
insufficient, was that it is riot legally obli-
gated to do either. The hostility between 
the trustee and petiti6ner has impaired 
the proper administration of the trust, and 
therefore requires the removal and substi-
tution of the trustee. 
The orders denying removal and substitu-
tion of the trustee, and instructing the trus- , 
tee, are reversed. 
GIBSON, C. J., and SCHAUER, PE-
TERS, and WHITE, JI., concur. 
o im \"'.= •• "',"' .. "m"n=." 
, 
21 Cal.Rptr.589 
Ernest Moody BEST, Petitioner, 
•• 
The STATE BAR OF'CALIFORNIA, 
Respondent. 
L. A. 26609. 
i 
Supreme Court o~ California. 
In Bank. 
May 15, 1962. 
Rehearing Denied June 13, 1962. 
A proceeding was brought by an attor-
ney to review a recommendation of the 
Board of Governors of; the State Bar of 
California that he be disbarred. The Su-
i 
preme Court held that ;evidence sustained 
findings that attorney viqlated Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct relating to the solicitation 
of professional employment and willfully 
breached his oath as an attorney never to 
mislead the judge, and that the penalty of 
disbarment was not excessive. 
Attorney ordered disbarred. 
I. Attorney and Client 08=>57 
In disciplinary proceeding against at-
torney, findings. of .fact by local adminis-
trative ,committees and Board of Governors 
of State Bar are' not binding on Supreme 
Court, and Supreme Court will weigh and 
pass on sufficiency ,of evidence to sustain 
findings of Board of Governors. 
2. Attorney and Client 08=>57 
Burden is on attorney seeking to review 
recommendation of Board of Governors of 
State Bar in disciplinary proceeding to 
show that its findings are not supported by 
the evidence or that its recommendation is 
erroneous or unlawful. 
3. Attorney and Client 08=>53(2) 
Evidence sustained -finding that attor~ 
ney violated Rules of Professional Conduct 
relating .to solicitation of professional em~ 
ployment. Rules of Professional Conduct, 
rules 2, 3, West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code 
following section 6076. 
4. Attorney and Client 08=>53(2) 
Evidence sustained finding that attor~ 
ney wilifully breached his oath as attorney 
never to seek to mislead judge. West's 
Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6068 (d). 
5. Attorney and Client e=46 
Acquittal of attorney in criminal pro-
ceeding did not bar disbarment proceeding 
based on same acts. West's Ann.Bus. & 
Prof.Code, §§ 6075 et seq., 6106. 
6. Attorney an~ Client ~9 
Disciplinary proceeding against attor-
ney is not intended for his punishment, but 
is for protection of public, courts, and legal 
profession. West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, 
§ 6075 et seq. 
7. Attorney and Client 08=>54 
Trial committee did not err in permit-
ting investigator for State Bar to be present 
during certain hearings relative to charges 
against attorney in disciplinary proceeding. 
Rules of Procedure of State Bar, rule 8, 
West's Ann.Bus. & Prof. Code, following 
section 6087. 
